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Abstract 
 
The government’s public service reform policy emphasises the collaboration of local 
authorities with a network of other agencies in the locality, either through contracts or 
through partnership arrangements. Strong encouragement is currently being given to 
the involvement of ‘third sector’ organizations (including social enterprises) in such 
partnering arrangements. This environment has opened up new opportunities for 
social enterprises. However, as the DTI has asserted in relation to social enterprise, 
‘rhetoric rather than a robust evidence base continues to inform many arguments for 
its growth and support’ (DTI, 2003a: 49). This paper examines one of the most 
widespread examples of social enterprise in the provision of public services: ‘new 
leisure trusts’. It asks whether the combination of entrepreneurial skills and social 
purpose in social enterprises such as new leisure trusts provides a useful model 
upon which public service partnerships could be based. Findings show that these 
social enterprises can work to create synergy through improved input/output ratios, 
commitment to meeting social objectives and wider stakeholder involvement. 
However, there are issues of incentivisation and relative autonomy that must be 
resolved within such partnerships, and more work to be done in some cases to build 
genuine social inclusion.  
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Introduction        
 
The delivery of public services is no longer a straightforward matter in UK local 
authorities (Butcher, 2002; Peck & 6, 2006). The last three decades of public sector 
reform, often presented as the product of fiscal pressures, can equally be portrayed 
as a period of 'adaptive capacity reform' (Toonen & Raadschelders, 1997). This 
reform has seen significant reductions in the direct provision of public services by 
local authorities through divestment, the opening of services to private sector 
competition, and a rise in the level of ‘agencification’ (Clarke & Newman, 1997), 
whereby services are provided by agencies that are (at least) semi-autonomous from 
government (Pollitt et al, 2005). New Labour’s pragmatic reform policy of ‘what 
matters is what works’ has further driven the collaboration of local authorities with a 
network of other agencies in the locality, either through contracts or partnership 
arrangements. Indeed, early in his premiership, the former Prime Minister stated 
outright that ‘it is in partnership with others that local government’s future lies’ (Blair, 
1998: 17).  
 
‘Partnering’ arrangements have been implemented for the opportunities they bring 
for synergy or ‘collaborative advantage’ (Clarke & Stewart, 1997; Pierre, 1998; 
Huxham, 1995). More specifically, they have been claimed to help optimise service 
provision by leveraging additional resources (Peters, 1998), or creating scope for a 
greater alignment of objectives and agreement on action (Stewart, 1996; Huxham & 
Vangen, 1996; Foster & Plowden, 1996). In this way, it is asserted that partnering 
arrangements can help to secure beneficial ‘culture changes’ for service delivery, 
leading to improved services to the community and a greater focus on service users 
(ODPM/Strategic Partnering Taskforce, 2003).  
 
One emerging strand of government policy is the strong encouragement being given 
to the involvement of ‘third sector’ organizations in such partnering arrangements. 
This has been supported by the newly-created Office of the Third Sector (OTS) 
within the Cabinet Office. The government’s interest in involving the sector in public 
service provision is made clear in the local government White Paper, ‘Strong and 
Prosperous Communities’: 
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This emphasis on third sector involvement sets the context for this article. However, 
we focus here on an example from just one part of the third sector: social enterprise 
(SE). A social enterprise is ‘a business with primarily social objectives whose 
surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the 
community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders 
and owners’ (Treasury/Cabinet Office, 2006: 29). Increasingly over the last decade, 
the combination of entrepreneurial skills and social purpose in SEs has been 
recognized as a useful model upon which some of these new partnerships could be 
based (DTI, 2003b: 28). This recognition prompted the establishment of the Social 
Enterprise Unit at the DTI in 2001 (now incorporated within the OTS). In a recent 
OTS report, the former Prime Minister stated his support:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A clear momentum has therefore been generated, and a push to identify ways to 
provide public services in partnership with social enterprise is now taking place 
throughout government (e.g. Cabinet Office, 2002; OTS, 2006a; b; Treasury, 2002a; 
b; 2003; ODPM, 2003; 2004; DCLG, 2006; DoH, 2003; 2006; DfES, 2001; DTI, 
2003b). Nevertheless, the term ‘social enterprise’ is used to cover a large range of 
organizations that have emerged from many diverse backgrounds, and which vary in 
their size and duration of existence. While these differences cannot be ignored, 
translating them into an easily useable typology for analysis is problematic (Hart & 
Haughton, 2007). In one useful approach, Paton (2003) distinguishes between 
member-led SEs operating at community level and funder-led SEs providing services 
‘To deliver the ambitions in this White Paper, local government will need to 
work in partnership with the third sector. Their expertise and enterprise 
needs to be harnessed and developed to enable local authorities to fulfill 
their place-shaping role’ 
(DCLG, 2006, Vol. 2: 55) 
“We know that, throughout the country, there are programmes being delivered 
by social enterprises that work brilliantly. It is groups like these at the front line 
of delivery who know about what works and what doesn’t. Their creativity, their 
innovation, their energy, and their capacity to build trust are helping us to meet 
the tough challenges ahead and to drive improvements, to extend choice and 
to give a voice to the public” 
(Blair, 2006, foreword) 
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under contract. Lloyd (2002) makes similar distinctions between ‘community 
enterprises’ and ‘social businesses’, but perhaps gets closest to the type of SE we 
seek to address in his third category of ‘mixed format’ social enterprises, which 
combine elements of community enterprises (e.g. locally-based, oriented towards 
addressing community needs) and social businesses (e.g. managed for contract 
service delivery, surpluses for community benefit), but also retain a need for 
legitimation from authorities. These organizations encompass both existing, 
independently-created SEs (some of whom have successfully negotiated 
relationships with the public sector for service delivery; DTI, 2002; 2003a), and 
newly-created examples where local authorities themselves have acted as 
'midwives' to their birth (Painter et al, 1997: 242). Our particular focus is on the latter. 
As the OTS explains: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the most widespread examples of how the public sector has sought to 
harness social enterprise in this way is through ‘new leisure trusts’ (NLTs). The most 
commonly-cited example is Greenwich Leisure Limited (GLL) in South London, but 
trusts have now been developed in over 100 local authority areas in the UK 
(Simmons, 2003; 2004). They have been praised for their ability to bridge sectoral 
boundaries, and are now being held up as successful examples of what social 
enterprise has to offer in the delivery of public services (e.g. OTS, 2006b; Social 
Enterprise Coalition, 2004; DTI, 2002; Mayo & Moore, 2001). Before we move on to 
consider this case, however, it is important that we understand the criteria by which 
the role and potential of such social enterprises might be assessed. 
 
 
 
 
‘Over the last few years, and within a framework of public sector 
accountability and commissioning, social enterprises have been formed 
from within the public sector in a number of areas of delivery…. Such new 
forms of provider offer another potential way of delivering services that can 
harness the power of local communities through mutual, community and 
employee ownership or management’  
(OTS, 2006a: 30) 
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Delivering Public Services through Social Enterprises    
 
Despite policy exhortations for the greater involvement of SEs in public service 
delivery, the public sector and social enterprise are still in the process of learning 
about each other. As a recent Treasury/Cabinet Office report observes, ‘there is a 
desire to be able to demonstrate the third sector’s impact more persuasively through 
a stronger evidence base’ (Treasury/Cabinet Office, 2006: 42) – an observation that 
applies equally to the evaluation of social enterprises. At least two factors combine to 
make this a challenging task. First, as we have established, the diversity of social 
enterprises (historically, structurally and functionally) makes generalisation difficult. 
Second, the incremental way in which social enterprises establish ‘alternative but 
also socially and economically effective spaces’ can make it difficult to identify their 
radical impact (Arthur et al, 2004: 13). For example, it can take time for the 
grounding in everyday working practice of such characteristics as self-organisation 
(‘doing it for ourselves’), dialogic forms of regulation, and a concern for both social 
and economic outcomes. This set of arrangements may therefore only gradually gain 
legitimacy through demonstrating success and survival (Arthur et al, 2004). 
Nevertheless, a number of elements are held to apply in common to social 
enterprises, and these provide at least some basis for an assessment of the potential 
of social enterprise to deliver improvements in public services (Hart & Haughton, 
2007). A number of potential benefits and pitfalls have been identified, which we can 
address in turn.  
 
According to the Social Enterprise Strategy (DTI, 2002: 8), successful social 
enterprises exemplify four key values: 
 
- Enterprise 
- Competitiveness  
- Innovation 
- Social inclusion 
 
Enterprise relates to social enterprises’ attitude to risk. In comparison with the public 
sector, where political decision-making and accountability may tend towards a more 
risk-averse environment, social enterprises may be considered to have a more 
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dynamic, adaptable, and flexible approach (Treasury, 2002b). Competitiveness 
relates to social enterprises’ ability to do the ‘same for less’. In today’s procurement 
environment, this means not only being able to provide the same quality of services 
for less than the public sector is currently paying, but also being able to do it for the 
same or less than commercial private sector competitors. Innovation relates to social 
enterprises’ ability to work creatively and find new solutions for service delivery 
problems, whether this involves actively inducing change or adapting quickly to 
changes driven by outside forces (OTS, 2006b; Glor, 2002). The relative autonomy 
and manoeuvrability of social enterprises (compared with public sector authorities) 
may be seen to provide them with particular advantages in this respect. Finally, 
social inclusion relates to the way that social enterprises approach their relationship 
with the communities they serve. Social enterprises are often seen to be socially 
inclusive in the extent to which they are: (i) able to achieve a close understanding of 
and commitment to their client groups (Treasury, 2002b), and (ii) inclined to include a 
diverse range of stakeholder interests in their governance structures (Westall, 2001; 
Turnbull, 2001).  
     
Yet the use of social enterprises for delivering public services has often been 
hampered by uncertainty (DTI, 2003b). This uncertainty has largely centred on three 
factors:  
 
- Survival/performance of service  
- Ethos of the organisation/‘Cultural fit’ 
- Accountability and partnership factors 
 
With regard to the survival/performance, there may be uncertainty about the ongoing 
viability of a social enterprise, its risks of performance failure and/or contract 
dependency, and its ability to generate a flow of suitable alternative business to 
balance public sector contract activity (DTI, 2003b: 11). Questions have also been 
raised about social enterprises’ ability to raise development finance from financial 
institutions (DTI, 2002), a matter that prompted a review by the Bank of England 
(Bank of England, 2003). With regard to the ethos of the organisation, the issue 
relates to anxieties in some quarters over the loss of what has been called the ‘public 
sector orientation’ once services are no longer delivered directly (Corry et al, 1997). 
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Even where the case for partnership working has been accepted, there are often 
related anxieties over the ‘cultural fit’, or scope for an alignment of objectives and 
agreement on action (Huxham & Vangen, 1996). Hence, for some observers it 
remains unclear as to whether the development of a partnership with social 
enterprise will generate ‘synergy’ or not (e.g. Huxham & Vangen, 2000). 
Accountability issues generally relate to the ‘democratic deficit’ that is often said to 
apply in local agencies, whereby ‘democratic accountability’ is weakened (i.e. control 
is not held exclusively by democratically-elected representatives), even if 
‘managerial accountability’ is ostensibly made more robust (i.e. service managers 
are more directly accountable to service users) (Pollitt et al, 1998). 
 
Developing the evidence base in relation to SEs’ involvement in public service 
provision requires us to see how the above issues work out in practice. In this article 
we address the following overarching question: is the combination of entrepreneurial 
skills and social purpose in social enterprises a useful model upon which public 
service partnerships could be based? More specifically, we ask: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• How do the above positive values associated with social enterprises 
translate into actual, real-life practices? For example, within public 
service partnerships, how do SEs balance the need for enterprise, 
competitiveness and innovation with the need for social inclusion and the 
maintenance of a ‘public service orientation’? If the practices of a social 
enterprise are too closely identified with the commercial sector, will it be 
called into question for underplaying its social role? Conversely, if its 
practices are too closely identifiable with those of the public sector, will its 
entrepreneurial role be called into question? These questions bring into 
relief a range of tensions and conflicts for social enterprises, which, as 
the DTI (2002) points out, have to meet both a financial and social 
‘double bottom line’.   
• How seriously do the issues of survival, cultural fit and accountability 
impact on the effectiveness and sustainability of social enterprises’ ability 
to provide public services? Support for and growth of social enterprise 
solutions depends on reassurance being offered over such matters.  
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In considering these questions, this article examines the evidence from the specific 
case of new leisure trusts, before considering whether there are more general 
lessons that might be learned about the use of social enterprises to deliver public 
services.  
 
The Case of ‘New Leisure Trusts’          
 
New leisure trusts are ‘non-profit distributing organisations’, currently set up as either 
Industrial and Provident Societies for the benefit of the community (IPS) or as 
companies limited by guarantee (CLG). The council generally retains ownership of 
the facilities, leasing them to the trust, whilst also providing an annual grant to make 
up the difference between the trust’s income from user charges and the cost of 
operating the service. Trusts have been widely presented as a ‘partnering’ vehicle 
(Lowenberg, 1997; PSPRU, 1998; Glover & Burton, 1998). Their heritage lies in the 
‘creative defence’ (Elcock, 1994) of leisure services against two perceived forms of 
attack. First, as a non-mandatory council service, cuts in local government finance 
have increasingly placed leisure under threat (Taylor & Page, 1994: Ives, 2003). The 
advantages of trusts in defending against financial pressures are relatively 
straightforward: “A [trust] can obtain business rate relief and VAT savings which is an 
attractive option for local authorities faced with hard choices on budget cuts, 
closures, reduced services and redundancies” (CPS, 1998: 17). The second defence 
represents an attempt “to preserve a social welfare orientation in the face of what 
many considered to be an inexorable shift towards the ‘commercialisation’ of leisure 
services” (Curson, 1996: 46). Given the requirement for local authorities to use and 
develop competition as an essential management tool under Best Value (DETR, 
1998), such concerns have meant that transfer to a new leisure trust (as opposed to 
a private sector company) has commonly been seen as the ‘lesser of two evils’.  
 
This article draws on research to examine the experiences of new leisure trusts in 
providing this important local public service. The research sought to see how matters 
work out in practice with regard to culture change, performance, 
accountability/control, and governance/partnership. Evidence was sought from five 
cases, to establish how the change in organizational form had affected the service 
(see Table 1).  
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These NLTs were widely spread: from Scotland, to the North, Midlands, South West 
and South East of England. They were chosen to represent organizations of different 
size, different organizational structure and different choices about how the governing 
body was constituted. Comparisons were drawn between their experiences before 
and after transfer. Data collection included semi-structured interviews with key 
informants in both trusts and their ‘parent’ authorities (N = 25), focus groups with 
operational staff (N = 5), and documentary analysis. Key informants included senior 
trust managers (e.g. Chief Executive/Managing Director, Operations Manager, 
Finance Manager, Human Resources Manager), managers of individual sports 
facilities within the trust, senior officers of the parent authority responsible for 
regulation/partnership issues, and local councillors. In each case data was collected 
in the period following transfer. ‘Hard’ performance information about length of 
opening hours, staff turnover/absence, service usage, income and expenditure was 
generally available for the period since transfer had taken place. However, in some 
cases not all of this was available in the same format for the period prior to transfer, 
meaning that comparisons had to be taken on a ‘balance of probabilities’ from all the 
available evidence (cf. Pollitt et al, 1998). Additional evidence included ‘softer’ 
indicators such as culture change, the effectiveness of governance structures, 
accountability measures, and user involvement. In this article, the above evidence is 
examined in the light of the criteria developed in the previous section –  (i) success 
criteria and (ii) sources of uncertainty. The article subsequently seeks to identify the 
Trust      Organizational  Size          Services   Governing board 
        structure            provided 
 
A   CLG       L      Sports facilities  Mainly Appointed,  
Multi-stakeholder 
B    IPS       M      Sports facilities  Mixed Elected/Appointed,  
Multi-stakeholder 
C    IPS       S      Sports facilities  Mixed Elected/Appointed, 
Multi-stakeholder 
D    IPS       L      Sports facilities  Mixed Elected/Appointed, 
Multi-stakeholder 
E   CLG       M      Sports facilities  Mainly Appointed, 
Multi-stakeholder 
 
Key: CLG: Company Limited by Guarantee; IPS: Industrial and Provident Society; L (Large): ten or 
more different facilities; M (Medium): between six and nine different facilities; S (Small): between one 
and five different facilities. 
 
Table 1: Scope and characteristics of NLTs consulted 
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potential lessons to be learned from this example, as a contribution to the debate 
about harnessing social enterprise for public service delivery. 
 
Enterprise, Innovation and Competitiveness 
 
Evidence from the trusts on the purported advantages of social enterprises is 
encouraging. These new, independent organizations tend to be more 
entrepreneurial. Staff often have opportunities for a higher level of involvement and a 
greater sense of ownership over the success of the new organization. For some this 
had made their work more challenging:  
 
 
 
 
However, at least as many staff were clearly enjoying the change. In terms of 
enterprise, innovation and competitiveness, senior trust managers in all trusts 
reported being able to use financial resources more flexibly, and to make more 
responsive decisions without needing recourse to lengthy local authority procedures. 
To a large extent this was also the experience of facility managers, although it was 
often felt that this was accompanied by stronger regime of reporting/accountability to 
senior managers than it had been before transfer. Frontline staff also reported that 
change tended to happen more quickly, enabling them to be more responsive to user 
needs: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“It’s been a tough schedule, with lots of change in a short period…People 
are now being asked to work in a different way, and some people can’t 
cope with that” (Managing Director, IPS) 
“We’ve had loads of work done…Its busier now – but it’s absolutely great, isn’t 
it?” (Centre Manager, IPS) 
 “We are all very busy, busy…Things we have been wanting to get done for 
ages are now possible…It forces us to work doctors’ hours, which is tough - 
but we are all heartened by it, we’re all able to benefit” (Chief Executive, CLG) 
“The level of activity has definitely gone up… We are much busier now – you 
can see it all around you. You find yourself working longer hours, but funny 
enough a lot of us are enjoying it” (Duty Manager, IPS) 
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With the right structures and support in place, transfer can raise the level of activity 
and the intensity of that activity quite significantly. These conclusions are supported 
in the wider literature. As the Sports Council (1994: 3) suggests, trusts provide staff 
with a ‘fresh opportunity’, and ‘an impetus for renewed enthusiasm’: “the 
independence of trusts enables a more entrepreneurial, opportunistic, flexible and 
responsive style of management to develop”. Managers also identify benefits in 
being able to focus their efforts exclusively on the leisure service. As Curson (1996: 
43) observes, “the fact their operation is a core activity rather than a fringe activity of 
a multi-functional organisation with other priorities is important to trusts’ success”.     
 
To some extent, increased entrepreneurialism is driven by the increased need for 
trusts to compete with other leisure service providers in their environment. The 
sense of standing alone and having to compete to survive was widely perceived 
throughout the new organisations. As one facility manager told us:  
 
 
 
 
However, this greater autonomy has also brought a sense of being able to respond, 
and a feeling that they have broken free from some of the shackles that had held 
them back before.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Before, we knew the council would always give us money. As soon as we 
went to a trust that string was cut. Now if we want anything, we shout but 
we’re told to go away” (Centre Manger, IPS) 
“When we were with the council people were stuck in a rut - they felt 
depressed and threatened. Now that has changed” (Centre Manager, IPS) 
  
“Nowadays, if I can respond there and then to our customers, I will. Now 
we’re in a trust I’ve been told I can just get on with it, within reason.” (Centre 
Manager, IPS)  
“You don’t have to keep running backward and forward to committee…The 
board don’t give carte blanche, far from it, but we get yes-no support when 
we go to them – there is a shorter chain of command” (Operations Director, 
CLG) 
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The tensions between external and internal drivers for improved performance are 
exemplified in the words of one managing director:  
 
 
 
 
 
Undoubtedly, there is general recognition in all trusts of the importance of financial 
objectives. Not meeting targets, one trust manager observed, “would put jobs at 
risk”. However, the ability to plough operating surpluses back into the service was 
also widely reported by staff at all levels to be a ‘real incentive’ to good performance 
- particularly where this feeds trusts’ ability to progress their social objectives (such 
as equality of access, maintaining programme diversity to meet users’ needs, and 
conducting development and outreach work in the community). This commonly-held 
commitment to achieving social goals gives a good indication that the ‘public service 
ethos’ continues to operate in these NLTs. 
 
Following transfer, the sampled trusts all reported a more intense focus and higher 
levels of corporate activity. This indicates an increased level of output. Trusts also 
claimed that this additional output had been achieved with reduced financial support 
from their parent authorities, which indicates a reduction in the level of inputs. The 
change in this input-output ratio suggests improved economy and efficiency in NLTs. 
Of course, NLTs are not immune to bad management. One trust not included in the 
sample did fail. Described by a key respondent as ‘headless’, this organization was 
eventually taken over by another successful NLT. This highlights the need for all key 
stakeholders to support the transfer and be prepared to see it through. 
 
 
 
In the sampled trusts, the overall impression of improved performance was 
supported when we looked at key indicators such as usage, income and 
expenditure; all appeared to be performing well. For example, in one trust where the 
pre- and post-transfer comparison was relatively straightforward an increase in 
usage of 7.5 per cent and in turnover of 35 per cent was reported. There had also 
“The need to survive forces us to examine all management issues – is it 
economic, efficient, etc…..but our ability to focus and put in resources that we 
couldn’t before also forces us to constantly re-evaluate and respond to the 
needs of our community”. (Managing Director, CLG) 
“If they’re up for it they will make it a success. If they’re not on board – do 
something else”  (General Manager, IPS) 
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been an impact on staff morale, with staff turnover at 16 per cent (against a leisure 
industry norm of 25 per cent) and sickness at four per cent (against a level of nine 
per cent prior to transfer). In all cases, the indications from both documentary and 
anecdotal sources were that these kind of improvements were fairly typical.  
 
The wider literature reports similar gains. For example, in South Oxfordshire a 9% 
increase in attendances in 1999/2000 was followed up with a further 23% increase in 
2000/2001 (This is Oxfordshire, 2001). Similarly, in Islington usage increased from 
1.75m visits in 1997/8 to just under 2m by the end of 1999/2000 (Aquaterra Leisure, 
2000). Similarly, Mayo & Moore (2001: 17) consider the example of Greenwich 
Leisure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased income and reduced expenditure tie in well with trusts’ objectives of 
survival. There is also evidence of growth, mostly through investment in state-of-the-
art fitness and soft play facilities to capitalise on recent trends. Furthermore, 
improved financial performance provides trusts with the ability to cross-subsidise 
loss-making services (Allen, 2001). However, another key question concerns trusts’ 
performance against their social objectives. This involves responding to community 
needs and ensuring equality of access through the allocation of space, setting up of 
new facilities and equipment and provision of specialist staff. Again, evidence in all 
the sampled organizations showed these objectives to be taken very seriously. For 
example, two trusts had established arrangements for ‘GP referral’ to their fitness 
facilities, providing space and professional support to support community health 
objectives. All trusts had also maintained concessionary pricing arrangements - in 
one example even extending these to give free swimming to all children under 14. 
Additional community outreach work is also widely reported. For example, staff in 
one trust reported going out to rural areas in the district to encourage greater levels 
of participation, “instead of being complacent and expecting them to come to us”. 
Most trusts do see their commitment to social objectives as more than simply a 
“…a highly successful enterprise, which has increased the number of 
facilities in Greenwich from seven to eleven and trebled income in the last 
six years to over £9 million. At the same time it has more than halved the 
cost to the local authority for providing the service – and incidentally won 
quality marks under Investors in People, Charter Mark and ISO 9002”. 
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continuation of the pre-existing arrangements. There is therefore a sense in which things 
have been - as one councillor put it - “refined and honed”, to a point where resources are 
now being used more effectively to support progress in these matters. As a long-standing 
centre manager in one trust told us, “there has always been a focus on things like this – 
but not to the extent there is now”. 
 
Social Inclusion  
 
In relation to other aspects of social inclusion the story is more mixed. Trusts are 
governed by a board of directors (or equivalent committee). Corporate governance is 
therefore claimed to provide an arena in which stakeholder perspectives can come 
together for dialogue and negotiation, and trusts’ involvement of staff, service users 
and community representatives on the board is often promoted as a step forward in 
this respect. For at least one former trust Chief Executive, community involvement 
provides ‘the greatest advantage’: “We have 90 shareholders representing 
community groups, so they are all feeding us information about the local population” 
(David Kerrigan, quoted in Ramrayka, 1996). However, as Lowenberg (1997: 53) 
has pointed out: 
 
 
 
 
In practice, all of the trusts studied had different levels of representation from staff, 
users and the community on their governing structures, and different ways of 
engaging with them more widely. Staff representation was only possible in those 
trusts established as IPS; charity legislation prescribes against this in the CLGs. This 
has been claimed as an advantage by the Managing Director of GLL in terms of the 
inputs to governance (Sesnan, 1998). Managers in the sampled trusts agreed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“[Transfer] can produce closed, secretive, unresponsive organisations. The 
challenge for local authorities is to design the [trust] mechanism to promote 
effective involvement”. 
“Communication is a big issue. It was ‘them and us’ before between 
management and the staff – they’d never tell us anything. We now have 
more group meetings - it wouldn’t have been done under the council. Now 
there is very little ‘them and us’…after all, all the staff are shareholders” 
(General Manager, IPS) 
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Even in trusts established as CLGs, however, new opportunities are arising for staff 
involvement. This was widely acknowledged to be a positive thing: 
 
 
 
 
In all cases there was some user and community representation. However, given a 
lack of a clear constituency to elect them, they were generally nominated or 
appointed from local interest groups and organizations. This has led to some 
confusion over their roles as ‘citizen governors’ – is it predominantly to help steer the 
organization effectively, or to represent a user/community constituency? (Simmons 
et al, 2007). The inclusion of users and community representatives was universally 
considered to have been positive in this research, even by councillors who had 
previously enjoyed authoritative control over the service. Even so, trusts are 
beginning to embrace the democratic involvement of service users only cautiously, 
and when pressed on the matter there is often a recognition that they have ‘more to 
do’. This is problematic for some commentators, who insist that organisations such 
as NLTs, where there is a strong public interest, should be willing to give a stronger 
voice to informal stakeholders such as service users (Kumar, 1996).  
 
This would suggest stronger structures and processes for user involvement and 
participation beyond the Board – something that has not been widely considered or 
implemented by the sampled NLTs to date. One trust had specialist consultative 
groups for golf and climbing. In another trust focus groups were used to investigate 
particular marketing issues – for example the popularity of a new fitness class. 
However, these initiatives were piecemeal and did not feed into the governance 
structure directly. Even user surveys were used sparingly. As has been reported 
more generally for leisure providers (Guest & Taylor, 1999), there is a certain 
“We’re now getting invited to sit on things like the Staff Consultative Group. 
This would never have happened before. No chance.” (Duty Manager, 
CLG) 
“Staff are much more involved and committed. Democracy is important – if 
its being voted on they want to know what’s going on” (Centre Manager, IPS) 
“We are running our own company - we are making our own decisions” 
(Frontline staff member, IPS) 
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disenchantment with such methods, and the results do not appear to get fed 
systematically into the formulation of aims and objectives.1 
 
Survival/Performance of Service, Ethos of the Organisation/‘Cultural Fit’, 
Accountability and Partnership factors 
 
These areas were identified earlier as potential concerns over the use of social 
enterprises for local public services. Uncertainty underpins many of these anxieties. 
The future viability of trusts may seem uncertain, dependent upon the future actions 
of central government over NNDR and tax regulations. Also, councils often fear a 
loss of control following transfer to a NLT, reflecting the fact that significant financial 
and political investments have been made into leisure services over the years. This 
can lead to a resistance to hand over assets and responsibility for the stewardship of 
services to what may be seen as an ‘untried and untested’ independent organisation.  
 
Again, though, evidence on the ground is relatively encouraging. As we have seen, 
in general the trusts are performing well. Their survival and performance might be 
compromised by (i) the future availability of financial advantages, or (ii) their ability to 
raise capital finance. With regard to the first of these factors, changes in current 
regulations governing VAT and NNDR could certainly negate the key financial 
advantages for leisure trusts. However, such changes are currently thought to be 
unlikely, given the government’s commitment to social enterprise models. With 
regard to the second, there is conflicting evidence over trusts’ ability to raise the 
significant levels of finance required to refurbish or build new facilities. Several trusts 
(e.g. Barnsley, Greenwich, Sheffield) have been able to attract significant investment 
– often from sources which would be inaccessible to local authorities. Nevertheless, 
one of the earliest trusts, ‘Leisure Link’ in Bexley, found that investors were reluctant 
to come forward (Best Value Inspection Report, LB Bexley, 2001). This led to a 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) scheme being preferred. Successful trusts have 
demonstrated that fundraising and alliance building skills are important and that 
complacency in these matters should be avoided. 
 
 17
So what are the other issues as far as the ethos of the organisation, ‘cultural fit’, and 
accountability are concerned? Several issues have been put forward: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whereas councils have traditionally enjoyed direct and authoritative control of the 
local leisure service, they must rely on more indirect forms following transfer 
(Simmons, 2001; 2004). For the Sports Council (1994: 3), “the erosion of the local 
authority’s strategic control is a major issue”. Indeed, ‘members’ fears over loss of 
control’ has been quoted as the most important factor in local authorities rejecting 
the trust option (Thurrock, 1997; Simmons 2003). Against this, however, it has been 
argued that synergy may be created in the new organisations by bringing together a 
range of stakeholders in their governing structures (Huxham & Vangen, 1996; 2000). 
The suggestion here is that multi-stakeholding promotes a meaningful dialogue 
between stakeholders and reduces imbalances in the information and power held by 
each of them. This provides for an alignment of objectives and agreement on action 
(Huxham & Vangen, 1996) and also a system of checks and balances to help avoid 
the corrupting influence of power (Turnbull, 1997; 2001).  
 
In practice, experience seems to reflect the latter position. All trusts in the sample 
were all keenly aware of their multiple accountability relationships, admitting a range 
of stakeholder interests to the Board. In almost all cases, this has brought a positive 
payoff. Incorporating the perspectives of service users, staff, business interests and 
the wider community is widely acknowledged to have raised the level and quality of 
debate over service provision - even by councillors formerly solely responsible for 
the service.  
 
Trusts are generally regarded as being closer to the public sector than the for-profit 
private sector. However, some argue that the public service orientation associated 
with local authority services may still be eroded following transfer, (CPS, 1998). 
Despite the ‘more businesslike’ environment managers in the trusts have noted, 
• Loss to the council of control over services 
• Loss to the council of their ability to plan strategically for the needs of the 
whole area 
• Erosion of the ‘public service orientation’ 
• Probity and the nature of accountability 
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however, the movement to a more managerial culture has rarely been demonstrated 
to have had deleterious effects. It is common for trusts to report that greater 
autonomy and a single-issue focus have allowed more attentive management, a 
more dynamic approach, greater flexibility, and less ‘political interference’ in their 
work. Yet while these factors may be keenly felt, and contribute significantly to the 
sense of a changed organisational culture, this does not appear to have led to an 
abandonment of the more traditional values associated with public sector services. 
Nevertheless this is not to say that, if it is allowed to become excessive, autonomy 
does not carry dangers. Lane (1995: 110) identifies the tensions here: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The link between autonomy, performance and accountability is therefore important, 
and this provided another aspect for our research. 
       
Accountability and Control          
  
While managerial autonomy may have increased performance in NLTs, the interests 
of different stakeholders need to be incorporated into their accountability 
relationships. Trusts’ responsibilities stem from the specification by the parent 
authority of organisational activities, outputs and outcomes in such mechanisms as 
leases and funding agreements. From this perspective, the purpose of accountability 
"is to govern the relationship between those who delegate authority and those who 
receive it" (Simey, 1985: 237). However, as well as this more formal sense of 
accountability (or 'agency'), there is also a more informal sense (or 'moral obligation') 
(Thomas, 1998). This informal element is often of equal significance, representing 
responsibility for meeting the diverse expectations of other stakeholders such as 
workers and service users.  
 
“Without [autonomy] implementors cannot utilise their capacity to judge 
what means are conducive to the ends and adapt to environmental 
exigencies. However, complete autonomy for implementors would mean an 
absence of restrictions on their behaviour, so negating the fundamental 
accountability nature of the interaction between citizens and 
implementors”. 
 19
For organisations such as leisure trusts, Kumar (1996: 246) argues that "the pull in 
terms of accountability is likely to concentrate on the dominant actor who has strong 
voice and exit opportunities”, particularly if sanctions involve the withdrawal of 
financial resources. Actors with strong exit and voice therefore tend to be state 
funding agencies. Discussions with trust managers and staff show there is little doubt 
who is seen as the leading stakeholder. As one Centre Manager expressed it, “the 
council is king”. However, Johnson et al. (1998: 324) have noted that for state 
funders there are issues surrounding the availability and use of exit. The closure of 
an agency or the withdrawal of the contract are ultimate sanctions, but the possible 
political repercussions and the interruption of service mean they will be used only as 
a last resort. The use of ‘exit’ sanctions is therefore problematic for parent 
authorities.  
 
 
 
 
 
Maintaining an appropriate level of influence over NLTs involves a greater role for 
‘voice’, and local authorities are beginning to establish a new dialogue with trusts, 
even though their influence may now be seen as more indirect, flexible and 
subjective as it crosses organisational boundaries (Skelcher, 1998). Authorities 
retain a strong leverage over the way trusts conduct their business via clauses in 
property leases, service level agreements tied to the annual revenue grant and 
involvement in corporate governance structures. Rather than direct control, however, 
these arrangements require the ‘management of influence’ (Stewart, 1995). This 
influence was generally considered in the trusts to be very strong, but it was also 
recognised that parent authorities now have to ‘bob and weave’ in a constant 
process of negotiation and renegotiation with the trust as a principal in its own right.  
 
 
 
 
 
“The council's power is mediated by the consequences of using it. They 
have absolute control but no control" (Chair, CLG) 
 
“Exertion of the council’s influence has never been tested – I hope it won’t 
be” (Local Councillor) 
“The council’s influence is always there – they hold the purse strings in the 
last resort” (Centre Manager, CLG)  
‘Their influence is as strong on aims and objectives, but less strong on how 
to do it’ (Centre Manager, IPS) 
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Some suggest that “the ability of elected officials to respond to public pressure and 
change aspects of a service on a day-to-day basis is gone” (Corry et al., 1997: 45). 
However, the movement away from the authoritative relationships previously enjoyed 
by elected members does not appear to have had any notably deleterious effects. 
Important issues emerging from the political process may still be brought forward - 
for example through formal representation of the Council on the board, where they 
can be discussed with other board members drawn from a range of backgrounds 
and perspectives. 
 
For informal stakeholders, voice is also the most effective available form of influence. 
Yet in the absence of stronger formal sanctions this may not represent much of a 
threat. Here accountability “depends rather less upon any clearly defined right of 
those accounted to and rather more on the willingness of those who are 
accountable” (Leat, 1988: 20). This has led to familiar accusations of a ‘democratic 
deficit’ in the NLTs. Trusts argue that this deficit is balanced out by gains in 
managerial responsiveness to the concerns of service users. For some 
commentators, however, the mechanisms of managerial accountability do not go far 
enough to fully redress the balance. Kumar (1996: 250) puts it quite simply: “In order 
to operate accountably, organizations need a forum where stakeholders can 
negotiate” (emphasis added).  
 
Corporate governance provides an arena in which stakeholder perspectives can 
come together for dialogue and negotiation. As we have noted, the inclusion of a 
range of stakeholder interests to the Board has brought positive payoffs in all the 
trusts sampled (even if their wider participatory structures could be strengthened). In 
this way, trusts’ multi-stakeholder governance structures can provide new ways of 
doing business, working with parent authorities to meet strategic goals in ways that 
use the strengths of each to the benefit of both.  
 
‘We don’t have freedom to decide direction - this is tied up with the council. 
But we do have greater freedom to manage…it’s an implementation thing’ 
(Senior Operations Manager, CLG) 
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These arrangements form the basis of an emerging sense of partnership between 
trusts and their parent authorities, and they are proving to be both popular and 
effective. Partnership is a key issue for both trusts and their parent authorities. From 
trusts’ point of view, the push is likely to be for greater autonomy.  
 
 
 
 
However for parent authorities, tensions may arise around their responsibilities in 
simultaneously contributing to the partnership whilst exercising control. As one 
senior council officer put it:  
 
 
 
 
The balance between organizational autonomy and local authority control/influence 
remains at the heart of these new partnerships. An insight into these issues, 
alongside an understanding of what constitutes ‘positive partnering’, should form a 
fundamental part of our understanding of the relationships upon which future service 
delivery and service development in ‘mixed format’ SEs such as NLTs is coming to 
depend.          
 
Harnessing Social Enterprise for Public Services: some lessons? 
 
What lessons can be learned from the example of NLTs when it comes to the wider 
involvement of social enterprises in public service delivery? As Hart & Haughton 
(2007) observe, it is possible to assess the ‘value added’ of the social enterprise 
model, but this requires detailed study of specific social enterprises and their local 
contextual circumstances. The limited scope and largely qualitative nature of this 
study mitigates against generalizing too widely. Nevertheless, this case throws up a 
number of issues around performance, accountability, governance and partnership, 
which also feature strongly in the more generic discussions of social enterprise in the 
academic and policy literature (e.g. DTI, 2002; DoH, 2006; OTS, 2006b; Paton, 
2003; Lloyd 2002; Arthur et al, 2004). We therefore feel able to identify areas where 
"In regard to the partnership there are still some issues to be resolved - the 
relative autonomy of the Board, the scope of its independence of action 
and arrangements for the use of surpluses"  (Chair, CLG) 
"It's not a policing role - we regard it very much as a partnership issue. On 
the other hand we are publicly accountable ourselves and have to be clear 
that money is being used effectively" 
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others may learn from NLTs’ experiences. In particular, it is believed that trusts share 
a number of attributes with other ‘mixed format’ social enterprises, which have both a 
contract management and community role, and an ongoing need for legitimation 
from key stakeholders.  
 
As stated at the outset, the public and social enterprise sectors are still in the 
process of learning about each other. It sometimes remains unclear as to whether 
the development of partnerships with social enterprise will generate ‘synergy’ or not. 
According to Stewart (1996: 7), ‘there is no point in a partnership if it does not add 
value. It will add value by bringing in resources that are not otherwise available 
(financial, skills, power)’. However, more recent analyses have emphasised that 
partnerships should not only focus on the inputs into a particular project or 
programme, but also on some shared responsibility for outputs/outcomes. Hence, 
partnerships involve a form of power in which actors gain a capacity to act by 
blending their resources, skills and purposes (Stoker, 1998). In the main, NLTs 
provide a good example of how social enterprises can work to achieve synergy from 
both of these perspectives. More specifically, this synergy arises from the 
combination of entrepreneurialism (in greatly improved input/output ratios), and 
social performance (strong commitment and action to meeting social objectives). In 
terms of the capacity to act, synergy also arises from the design of the partnership 
and governance models. The partnership model works through the combination of 
‘strong’ measures such as the termination of leases, grounds for ongoing negotiation 
over quality and quantity in the service-level contract, and spaces within which such 
ongoing negotiation can take place (such as Council representation on the Board). 
The governance model works through enhanced stakeholder involvement, widely 
acknowledged to have led to a greater alignment of objectives and agreement on 
action through enhanced levels of dialogue and debate. It therefore seems that there 
are gains to be made from partnerships between the public sector and social 
enterprises where: 
(i) Entrepreneurialism and autonomy are likely to provide efficiency gains 
(ii) There are clear social objectives for the service that must be maintained 
(iii) There are a number of legitimate stakeholder constituencies whose voices 
should be included in governance 
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(iv) Both public sector authorities and social enterprises are committed to 
‘positive partnering’. 
 
Trusts’ experience shows that local government partnerships with social enterprises 
can provide improvements against the key values of enterprise, competitiveness and 
innovation. With regard to enterprise, there is little doubt that trusts have a different 
attitude to risk. As one trust representative has put it, ‘speculating to accumulate isn’t 
really something local authorities are good at’ (Wallis, 1999). This enterprising 
approach is supported by an increase in managerial and financial autonomy, and an 
output orientation that appears to encourage greater dynamism, responsiveness and 
innovation. As well as gains from a more entrepreneurial approach, social 
enterprises may be able to access relief from such expenses as VAT and business 
rates, meaning that in effect the same service can be run for less. However, social 
enterprises must remain aware that where the contractual arrangements for public 
funding are regularly renegotiable, efficiency savings in one period can be absorbed 
by reductions in their revenue grant the next. This carries the risk of de-motivating 
managers and staff in the new organisation, and (as one trust chief executive put it 
to us) ‘killing the goose that lays the golden egg’. Issues of incentivisation are 
therefore important for all social enterprises, and should be set against the strong 
expectation in the recent local government White Paper that local authorities will 
pass on funding stability to the third sector (DCLG, 2006).  
 
Local government partnerships with social enterprises may also provide a better 
balance between operational autonomy and control from the council. The 
combination of social enterprises’ ‘double bottom line’ and service managers’ 
increased decision-making autonomy appears to help better achieve financial 
objectives without marginal costs to social objectives. The benefits of autonomy 
identified by trust managers include clearer goal setting, more proactive 
management to these goals, increased use of performance-related incentives, 
greater attention to organisational communication strategies, and improvements in 
the quality and usage of information management systems. Yet in these and other 
aspects, social enterprises often mirror the characteristics claimed for their 
commercial competitors. It is worth noting that social enterprises must ensure that 
their performance profile is at least comparable with that of other organisational 
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forms, and therefore this degree of similarity is to be both expected and welcomed. 
However, there is little to be gained from the simple emulation of the commercial 
sector. Arguably, what is different about social enterprises is the way in which a 
distinctive set of values is put into practice, particularly around inclusive 
arrangements for service provision, governance and user involvement. Alongside 
good financial performance, social enterprises therefore need to pay equal attention 
to developing their ‘inclusive potential’ through a firm connection with the 
communities they serve if they are to make the most of what constitutes their ‘unique 
selling point’.  
 
Relatedly, newly-created social enterprises’ cannot afford to be complacent that their 
‘social bottom line’ will be enough to protect them from the forces of competition to 
which they have been exposed. While they may initially enjoy a degree of political 
commitment stemming from their ability to both retain key social objectives and save 
money, such support may be short-lived if commercial competitors are able to offer 
an ostensibly similar service at an even lower cost. The real-world reality in some 
locations is that some private contactors are claiming to be able to do this, because 
they are able to spread their overheads over a much larger volume of work. In order 
to compete in financial terms, SEs may therefore come under pressure to spread 
their own overheads by taking on contracts across a wider geographical area. This is 
particularly likely to happen if SEs are unable to demonstrate how (and to what 
extent) their social objectives are achieved. Social enterprises must stay aware of 
what other service providers can offer and find ways of remaining competitive. The 
experience of GLL, which manages leisure facilities in 9 local authority areas, shows 
that NLTs can compete to win contracts and grow their business. However, this may 
eventually have implications for social inclusion. As Chanan (2003: 28) points out, 
the promotion of social enterprise to deliver public services ‘takes much of its moral 
force from some unspoken connection with the community as a whole’. This reflects 
their ability to generate and employ ‘solidarity inputs’ (Lloyd, 2002) at all levels – 
from retaining the interest and commitment of councillors and support from the local 
community and community organizations, to a greater sense of ownership and 
involvement from staff. Some SEs (including those formed from within the public 
sector) are already strong in this area. Others need to do more, for example by 
widening and deepening processes of user involvement, extending inclusive 
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structures and processes beyond the Board to the wider population of users and 
citizens. Expansion beyond one local authority area could undermine further 
progress in this respect, unless such SEs redouble their commitment to sustaining 
strong and inclusive links with the communities they serve.  
 
In common with NLTs, all ‘mixed format’ social enterprises involved in public service 
delivery must be continually aware of the need to strike the difficult balance between the 
‘social’ and the ‘entrepreneurial’. However, it should be noted that the responsibility for 
this does not lie exclusively with social enterprises themselves. As far as possible, 
this balance needs to be agreed and have support from both sides of the partnership 
if there are not to be irresolvable tensions. This requires a constructive approach to 
partnership, and for both parties to commit to minimising ‘inter-organisational 
distance’ through openness and transparency, regular dialogue and negotiation. 
Where this distance is allowed to develop, it can be counterproductive for both 
partners. For example, in one trust the Council had closed down its contract 
monitoring department on the day of transfer, relying on monthly meetings between 
the Chief Executive of the trust and Chief Officer of the Leisure Department to 
conduct its partnership business. This had led to deep disappointments about future 
opportunities, at least on the part of the trust: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SEs need to balance their desire for autonomy with the need to maintain their 
credibility and legitimacy in managing a public service. Too much autonomy can 
provide problems in two ways:  
 
 
 
 
(i) If local authorities begin to feel out of touch, it may trigger additional 
accountability and reporting requirements which add significantly to 
the SE’s administrative workload  
“I think the council should have a more proactive role in policy, with what we 
are doing, but they don’t. In some ways that suits us because we can do 
what we want to - within parameters. But I think it would be of greater benefit 
to the service as a whole if there were joint policy work.”   
(Operations Director, CLG) 
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The DTI (2003b: 65) therefore suggests that SEs need to stand up and ‘be proud’, 
reporting regularly to all stakeholders and celebrating their successes in achieving 
their social and other goals. For their part, local authorities also need to stay in touch 
with developments; too often an ‘out-of-sight, out-of-mind’ mentality can develop 
once they no longer deliver a public service directly. In this scenario, key people can 
take their ‘eye off the ball’, reducing the authority’s level of influence and/or allowing 
complacency (or worse, corruption) to set in. In reality, social enterprises and local 
authorities are locked together. A positive approach to partnering – developing 
greater openness and transparency, sharing responsibility for service planning and 
avoiding scapegoating and buck-passing - is therefore necessary if the relationship 
is going to work.  
 
Social enterprises form a key part of the government’s vision for an increased role 
for the third sector in public service partnerships. However, partnerships between 
local authorities and social enterprises will not be suitable for every local public 
service, or in every location. More specifically, there may be insufficient economic, 
social and political capital for social enterprises to emerge and thrive. As Sesnan 
(1998) has put it, their suitability depends on ‘what you want to put in’ (e.g. time, 
commitment, finance), and ‘what you want to get out’ (e.g. financial return, social 
return). Hence, the context is important, and some services/locations will be more 
suited to these kinds of partnerships than others. This is a matter for local debate. 
However, where the conditions are considered to be conducive, the case of NLTs 
shows that social enterprises can provide excellent partners for the potential synergy 
or collaborative advantage they are able to create. Furthermore, experience 
suggests that the potential concerns we have identified around incentivisation, 
relative autonomy and genuine social inclusion are implementation issues that can 
be minimized or eliminated through a more planned and proactive approach. In sum, 
we argue that this evidence provides further support for the continued interest of 
(ii) If SEs do not ‘stay close’ to their communities and local political      
leaders, this can result in a loss of commitment and political influence -    
something that may eventually undermine their position when re- 
tendering for management contracts   
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policy-makers in harnessing social enterprises, including new leisure trusts, to 
deliver local public services.  
                                            
1 In an interesting development, some more recent trusts established as IPS have extended the 
principle of ‘membership’ to local leisure card holders, rather than just staff. Projects such as 
‘Establishing Our Co-operative Advantage’, currently underway at Salford Community Leisure provide 
an interesting way forward here. The difference that this step might make to social inclusion remains a 
question for future research. 
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